Introduction: The Crisis of Theodicy
On November 1, 1755, an earthquake destroyed Lisbon. Tens of thousands died, many in churches where they were celebrating the Feast of All Saints. This catastrophe became a turning point for European consciousness. If God is good and omnipotent, how could such horror occur? Voltaire, in his "Candide," sarcastically mocked Leibniz's theory of "the best of all possible worlds." Traditional theodicy—the attempt to justify God despite the existence of evil—proved powerless.
Centuries later, John D. Caputo, a theological interpreter of Derridean deconstruction, declares: traditional theodicy is impossible. Why? Because it attempts to justify a sovereign God who, as causa prima and supreme being, must be responsible for the cosmic order, including evil. Caputo offers an alternative: "the weakness of God"—God not as power but as call, vulnerability, an event that finds us but does not control.
But is this sufficient? In this article, I argue that theodicy is possible only from the perspective of eschatological ontology, as developed by John Zizioulas, the contemporary Orthodox theologian. God's justification is not a logical explanation of why evil exists, but an eschatological event—the defeat of death in the Resurrection and the restoration of personal existence in communion. Theodicy is realized not in the past (at the moment of creation), but in the future (the eschaton), which is already partially realized in the Eucharist.
I. The Impossibility of Western Theodicy: The Trap of Substantialist Ontology
1.1. Leibnizian Theodicy and Its Crisis
Leibniz formulated classical theodicy in the 17th century: this world is "the best of all possible worlds" because God, as a perfect being, necessarily creates the optimal world. Evil is necessary for greater good—for spiritual growth, free will, for the contrast against which goodness shines. The Lisbon earthquake cast doubt on this logic: what "greater good" justifies the death of thousands of innocent people?
Traditional Western theodicy operates within the paradigm of metaphysical sovereignty: God is causa prima, the first cause who controls and determines everything. If God is omnipotent and good, He is responsible for everything, including evil. But precisely this responsibility becomes an obstacle: how can a perfect and good being be responsible for evil?
1.2. Caputo's Critique: The Problem of Onto-theology
Caputo argues that the problem is the onto-theological structure itself. Western metaphysics (from Aquinas to the present) treats God as the Supreme Being, the apex of the system of being. God is the foundation of all that exists, the first cause and final end. This is what Heidegger called "onto-theology"—the reduction of God to a metaphysical principle.
When God is understood this way—as sovereign, omnipotent, architect and controller of the world—He necessarily becomes responsible for evil. In Caputo's interview we read:
"Traditional theodicy tries to 'justify God' (theo-dicē) by explaining why an all-powerful and all-good God permits evil. But this assumes God as sovereign power, as causa prima who controls the cosmic order. This onto-theological God becomes responsible for evil precisely because of His omnipotence."
Caputo offers an alternative: the weak God, who is not power but call, event, vulnerability that calls us toward love but cannot compel. This God is not responsible for evil because He is not a sovereign ruler. He is weakness that is born in every act of love and justice.
1.3. The Internal Problem of Substantialist Ontology
But there exists a more fundamental problem that neither Leibniz nor Caputo sees: the type of ontology itself. Western philosophy, starting from Aristotle, operates within the framework of substantialist ontology. What does this mean?
Substantialist ontology means that existence is defined by nature (φύσις, physis), by the natural properties of essence. Every being is an individual—separated, defined by its substance. Being is self-identical, existing for itself.
But here lies the fundamental problem of theodicy: substantialist being necessarily leads to death. Why? Because every substance is subject to necessity—the laws of nature that drive it toward dissolution, disintegration, annihilation. Substance, as self-existing, is doomed to destruction.
From this follows the decisive conclusion: death and evil are not "something" added to good creation; they are the internal necessity of substantialist being. As long as existence is understood substantialistically—that is, as defined by nature, under necessity—death is inevitable.
This means that traditional Western theodicy is structurally impossible. Not because the logic is weak, but because it operates in an ontological framework where death (and consequently evil and suffering) is an inherent property of existence. If being is substantialist, death is necessary. If death is necessary, God—the creator of being—becomes responsible for death.
Caputo's "weak God," despite its radicalism, still remains in the apophatic-deconstructive sphere. It says what God is not (not power, not sovereign), but does not provide a positive ontological alternative. Caputo does not answer: if God is not causa prima, what kind of existence does He offer? How do God and creation exist if not substantialistically? And most importantly: how to overcome death if death is the necessity of substantialist being?
II. Zizioulas: Personal Ontology and the Nature of Death
2.1. Person vs. Individual: Ontological Revolution
John Zizioulas, a contemporary Orthodox theologian, offers a radical ontological alternative: personal ontology instead of substantialist. This is not merely a theoretical difference—it is a completely different vision of what it means to exist.
Zizioulas distinguishes between Person (Hypostasis, Ὑπόστασις) and Individual. The individual is defined by its nature (φύσις)—by its properties, categories, biological characteristics. The individual is for itself (in-dividuum—indivisible), a closed system.
The person, in contrast, is defined not by its nature but by relationship (relation, communion). Zizioulas's decisive formula ("Being as Communion"):
"Personhood as ekstasis and hypostasis of being. The person is, by definition, the being which is free from the necessity of its nature (physis)... The person is what it is by its relation to what is not itself."
Person is ekstasis (ἔκστασις)—going out from oneself toward the other. Person exists not for itself but in relationship. Its identity is not substantialist ("what it is") but relational ("with whom it is in relationship").
This distinction may seem abstract, but its consequences are decisive for theodicy: the person is free from necessity. While the individual is subject to the laws of its nature—growth, aging, death—the person is transcendent to this necessity. The person exists in freedom because it exists in love—in relationship that is not doomed by the laws of nature.
2.2. Death as the Tragedy of Substantialist Existence
From this follows Zizioulas's radical thesis about death ("Being as Communion"):
"[Death] is the tragic end of every being which is identified with its nature... The ultimate enemy of the person is not sin, but death which is the consequence of the way nature operates in our fallen existence."
Death is not something external "added" to existence as punishment for sin. Death is the inherent consequence of substantialist existence. When a being is defined by its nature (as individual), it is necessarily doomed to dissolution, because every substance is temporal, composite, dependent on its elements which ultimately disintegrate.
Here is the true problem of theodicy: death is not something that "happens" to the living, but the mode in which substantialist being exists. As long as existence is substantialist, death is inevitable. And death—not sin—is the ultimate evil, because death means non-being, fragmentation, loss.
Zizioulas argues that the Fall consists precisely in this: humanity's identification with its own nature, with individuality. Instead of existing personally (in relationship with God and one another), humanity chose to exist for itself—as individuals. And this choice made death inevitable.
2.3. God as Personal Being
But here Zizioulas poses the decisive question: if substantialist existence leads to death, how does God exist? Is God also substantialist? If God is also an individual, He too is doomed to death. But God is immortal and perfect. How is this possible?
The answer: God exists personally, not substantialistically. God is relationship—Trinity, where three persons (Father, Son, Spirit) exist in one another (περιχώρησις, perichoresis). God is not "one substance with three properties," but three persons in one communion.
Zizioulas's formula ("Being as Communion"):
"Being can exist as communion and freedom... The very being of God is communion. If this is so, then true being is achieved only through communion, which is realized in freedom and love."
God's being is communion. Not "God has communion," but God is communion. Personhood and relationship are the mode of God's existence. This is precisely why God is free from death: He does not exist as a substance that would be subject to necessity. God exists as freedom—personal freedom of existence in relationship.
From this follows that God is not causa prima of substantialist being (which is doomed to death). God is the source of personal being—a mode of existence that is free from death.
III. Eschatological Theodicy: "Remembering the Future"
3.1. Theodicy Not as Explanation but as Eschaton
Now we can formulate eschatological theodicy. Zizioulas's theodicy is not apologia (explanation of why evil exists) but prophecy (revelation of how God overcomes evil).
Traditional theodicy seeks an answer to the question: "Why?"—why did God create a world where evil exists? This is a retrospective question, directed toward the past, toward the moment of creation.
Zizioulas's theodicy answers a different question: "What?"—what is happening with death and evil? What is God's response? This is a prospective (eschatological) question, directed toward the future, toward the eschaton.
Zizioulas's central thesis: God calls His creation "good" (καλόν) not in its fallen state, but in its eschatological fulfillment. When God declares in the Book of Genesis "and it was good," this is not a description of the present state, but a prophecy of the eschaton—the world's completed, perfected, personally connected-to-God state.
This is what Zizioulas calls "Remembering the Future":
"The eschatological perception and the Kingdom of God serve as an inspiration, the truth that invites those who live by it to consider everything through the lens of the future Kingdom."
The goodness of creation is not static (which "was" in Eden and was lost) but dynamic—it is the future that comes from God and toward which God invites us. Creation is good because it will be perfect in the eschaton.
3.2. Christ: The First Person Who Defeated Death
How does this transformation from substantialist to personal existence occur? The answer: Incarnation and Resurrection.
In Christ, human nature was redeemed from substantiality and assumed personally. Zizioulas:
"The restoration of personhood in Christ leads inevitably to the community of the Church... through the personhood of man."
Christ is the first true Person in human history—a human who exists not for himself (as individual) but fully in relationship with God. Christ's self-identity is not defined by biological nature but by relationship with the Father: "I and the Father are one" (John 10:30).
This is precisely why Christ defeats death. Not because He has some magical power, but because He exists personally. Death is necessary for substantialist being, but Christ does not exist substantialistically. He exists as relationship—relationship with the Father, with humans, with the world. And this relationship is unconquerable by death.
The Resurrection is not an event about things (revival of a corpse) but the revelation of a new type of existence—personal existence that is not subject to biological necessity. The resurrected body is not flesh returned-to-life, but personal body—a body that exists as communion, as relationship, and is therefore free from dissolution and death.
3.3. Eucharist as the Realization of the Eschaton
But how do we attain this personal existence? How does substantialist creation become personal? The answer: Eucharist.
For Zizioulas, the Eucharist is not merely a ritual or symbolic act. The Eucharist is the realization of the eschaton, the actualization of the Kingdom of God here and now:
"The Church is Eucharistic in its very nature... Eucharist is the event of the Kingdom where death is already overcome."
In the Eucharist, the community of believers—different individuals—becomes a communion of persons. There is no longer "I" and "you" as separate individuals, but "we" as unity in Christ. In this moment, humans exist not as separate substances but as persons in relationship.
And because this existence is personal, it transcends death. In the Eucharist we already live in the resurrected Body (Body of Christ), which is personal, not substantialist. The Eucharist is "remembering the future"—that future which is already here but not yet fulfilled.
From this follows Zizioulas's radical conclusion:
"The ascetic life culminates in the Eucharist."
Asceticism—self-restraint, renunciation of one's individual needs—is practical theodicy. When a person renounces their ego, their individuality, their substantialist existence, they are freed from the necessity that leads to death. Asceticism is the practical path from individual to person.
And this process culminates in the Eucharist, where ascetic life is realized in communion—in relationship that is resurrected life, life that is already beyond death.
IV. Theodicy as Eschatological Event: God's Justification in the Resurrection
4.1. The Eschaton as God's "Response" to Evil
Now we can formulate eschatological theodicy with full clarity:
God's justification is not a logical explanation but an eschatological event—the defeat of death in the Resurrection and the restoration of personal existence in communion.
Traditional theodicy attempts to explain why God has the right to create a world where evil exists. It seeks logical justification. But this approach is impossible because:
If being is substantialist, death is necessary
If God created a substantialist world, God created death
If God created death, God is not justified
Western theology attempts to avoid this logic with various arguments (free will, greater good, etc.), but all these attempts are futile because they do not change the ontological framework.
Zizioulas's revolution consists in changing the question itself:
Not: "Why did God create a world where death exists?"
But: "What is God's response to death?"
The first question is retrospective and leads to accusation ("why did you do this?"). The second question is prospective and leads to acknowledgment ("what are you doing?").
And God's response is: Resurrection. God does not explain death—God defeats death. God does not give a logical scheme explaining why evil must exist—God enters death (the Cross) and destroys it from within (Resurrection).
4.2. Personal Communion as the Realization of Theodicy
The final formula of eschatological theodicy:
God is justified not by the "excellence" of His creation, but by the perfection of His action—the restoration of personal existence in the eschaton.
In Zizioulas's vision, theodicy is not justification of what is but promise of what will be. God is justified by the fact that:
God did not create death—death is the consequence of substantialist existence, and God created not substantialist beings but invited into personal existence
God Himself entered death—in Christ, God Himself went through the path of death
God defeated death—through the Resurrection, God revealed personal existence that is free from necessity
God invites us into the eschaton—in the Eucharist and ultimately in the Kingdom of God, where all creation will be personal and death will no longer exist
This is dynamic theodicy, not static. God is justified not by what He said ("let there be...") but by what He does (restores, resurrects, brings into communion).
4.3. Theodicy as Personal Freedom
And here we arrive at the deepest conclusion: true theodicy is personal existence itself.
When a human exists as person—that is, in relationship, in love, freely, ecstatically (gone out from oneself)—they transcend the being in which death is necessary. And in this transcendence, God is acknowledged as good:
"Love is not one of the properties of being, but a way of being... Love, if it is to be true love, must be the event of the loss of one's identity in the other."
When a person loses their identity in the other (in love), they are no longer an individual doomed to death. They are a person who exists immortally in relationship.
In Zizioulas's words ("Communion and Otherness"):
"Love is not one of the properties of being, but a way of being... Love, if it is to be true love, must be the event of the loss of one's identity in the other."
Thus, theodicy becomes not theory but praxis. God is justified not by words but by life—the life lived by persons in communion. Every time a human loves another (impossibly, self-sacrificially, ecstatically), God is justified, because this love is resurrected life—life that transcends death.
V. Conclusion: Why Only Eschatological Ontology Justifies God
Now we can formulate the final answer:
Theodicy is impossible within the framework of substantialist ontology because substantialist existence necessarily includes death. Western theology, from Leibniz to Caputo, fails to justify God because it operates in an ontological framework where being is defined by nature and therefore subject to necessity.
Caputo's "weak God" approaches an alternative by rejecting the sovereign, omnipotent God. As Derrida (whom Caputo cites) writes in "Rogues":
"For wherever the name of God allows us to think something else, for example, a vulnerable nonsovereignty, suffering and divisible, even mortal, capable of contradicting itself or of repenting (a thought that is impossible and without example), that would be a completely different story, perhaps even a story of God who deconstructs himself in his ipseity."
But Caputo remains in apophatic space—he says what God is not, but does not offer a positive ontology. Caputo also lacks an eschatological perspective—for him, the "weak God" is a constant call but not a fulfillment.
Zizioulas's eschatological ontology offers a radical solution:
Ontological revolution: personal existence replaces substantialist. Existence is defined not by nature (φύσις) but by relationship (communion)
New understanding of death: death is not "punishment" or "event" but the internal law of substantialist existence. Death is inevitable when existence is individual
Redirection of theodicy: the question changes from "why?" to "what?". God responds not with explanation but with action—Resurrection
Eschaton as justification: God is justified not in the past (at the moment of creation) but in the future (the eschaton), where the world will be completed as personal communion
Eucharist as realization: theodicy is not only "in the future"—it is already realized now in the Eucharist, where death is defeated and humans exist personally
Practical theodicy: God is justified not by theory but by life—life in communion, where love (personal existence) defeats death
Final Formula
God is justified not by explaining evil but by defeating it. And God defeats evil not by force but by love—by personal existence that is transcendent to death.
In substantialist ontology, theodicy is impossible because death is necessary. In personal ontology, theodicy is necessary because the person is free—free from necessity, free from death.
And this freedom is not merely an "idea" or "symbol"—it is reality that is realized here and now in the Eucharist, and will be fulfilled in the eschaton. Theodicy is not argument but Resurrection.
Therefore, only eschatological ontology—Zizioulas's personal and relational ontology—can truly justify God. Not with words but with life. Not in the past but in the future. Not with explanation but with transformation. Not with logic but with love.
And this love, this personal existence in communion, is God's glory (δόξα)—the revelation that justifies God not with words but with being: being that is free, that is love, that is resurrected, that is immortal.
Eschatological Theodicy: Why Western Theology CannotJustify God
Introduction: The Crisis of Theodicy
On November 1, 1755, an earthquake destroyed Lisbon. Tens of thousands died, many in churches where theywere celebrating the Feast of All Saints. This catastrophe became a turning point for European consciousness. IfGod is good and omnipotent, how could such horror occur? Voltaire, in his "Candide," sarcastically mockedLeibniz's theory of "the best of all possible worlds." Traditional theodicy—the attempt to justify God despite theexistence of evil—proved powerless.
Centuries later, John D. Caputo, a theological interpreter of Derridean deconstruction, declares: traditionaltheodicy is impossible. Why? Because it attempts to justify a sovereign God who, as causa prima and supremebeing, must be responsible for the cosmic order, including evil. Caputo offers an alternative: "the weakness ofGod"—God not as power but as call, vulnerability, an event that finds us but does not control.
But is this sufficient? In this article, I argue that theodicy is possible only from the perspective ofeschatological ontology, as developed by John Zizioulas, the contemporary Orthodox theologian. God'sjustification is not a logical explanation of why evil exists, but an eschatological event—the defeat of death inthe Resurrection and the restoration of personal existence in communion. Theodicy is realized not in the past (atthe moment of creation), but in the future (the eschaton), which is already partially realized in the Eucharist.
I. The Impossibility of Western Theodicy: The Trap of Substantialist Ontology
1.1. Leibnizian Theodicy and Its Crisis
Leibniz formulated classical theodicy in the 17th century: this world is "the best of all possible worlds" becauseGod, as a perfect being, necessarily creates the optimal world. Evil is necessary for greater good—for spiritualgrowth, free will, for the contrast against which goodness shines. The Lisbon earthquake cast doubt on thislogic: what "greater good" justifies the death of thousands of innocent people?
Traditional Western theodicy operates within the paradigm of metaphysical sovereignty: God is causa prima,the first cause who controls and determines everything. If God is omnipotent and good, He is responsible foreverything, including evil. But precisely this responsibility becomes an obstacle: how can a perfect and goodbeing be responsible for evil?
1.2. Caputo's Critique: The Problem of Onto-theology
Caputo argues that the problem is the onto-theological structure itself. Western metaphysics (from Aquinas tothe present) treats God as the Supreme Being, the apex of the system of being. God is the foundation of all thatexists, the first cause and final end. This is what Heidegger called "onto-theology"—the reduction of God to ametaphysical principle.
When God is understood this way—as sovereign, omnipotent, architect and controller of the world—Henecessarily becomes responsible for evil. In Caputo's interview we read:
"Traditional theodicy tries to 'justify God' (theo-dicē) by explaining why an all-powerful and all-good Godpermits evil. But this assumes God as sovereign power, as causa prima who controls the cosmic order. Thisonto-theological God becomes responsible for evil precisely because of His omnipotence."
Caputo offers an alternative: the weak God, who is not power but call, event, vulnerability that calls us towardlove but cannot compel. This God is not responsible for evil because He is not a sovereign ruler. He isweakness that is born in every act of love and justice.
1.3. The Internal Problem of Substantialist Ontology
But there exists a more fundamental problem that neither Leibniz nor Caputo sees: the type of ontology itself.Western philosophy, starting from Aristotle, operates within the framework of substantialist ontology. Whatdoes this mean?
Substantialist ontology means that existence is defined by nature (φύσις, physis), by the natural properties ofessence. Every being is an individual—separated, defined by its substance. Being is self-identical, existing foritself.
But here lies the fundamental problem of theodicy: substantialist being necessarily leads to death. Why?Because every substance is subject to necessity—the laws of nature that drive it toward dissolution,disintegration, annihilation. Substance, as self-existing, is doomed to destruction.
From this follows the decisive conclusion: death and evil are not "something" added to good creation; theyare the internal necessity of substantialist being. As long as existence is understood substantialistically—thatis, as defined by nature, under necessity—death is inevitable.
This means that traditional Western theodicy is structurally impossible. Not because the logic is weak, butbecause it operates in an ontological framework where death (and consequently evil and suffering) is aninherent property of existence. If being is substantialist, death is necessary. If death is necessary, God—thecreator of being—becomes responsible for death.
Caputo's "weak God," despite its radicalism, still remains in the apophatic-deconstructive sphere. It says whatGod is not (not power, not sovereign), but does not provide a positive ontological alternative. Caputo does notanswer: if God is not causa prima, what kind of existence does He offer? How do God and creation exist if notsubstantialistically? And most importantly: how to overcome death if death is the necessity of substantialistbeing?
II. Zizioulas: Personal Ontology and the Nature of Death
2.1. Person vs. Individual: Ontological Revolution
John Zizioulas, a contemporary Orthodox theologian, offers a radical ontological alternative: personalontology instead of substantialist. This is not merely a theoretical difference—it is a completely different visionof what it means to exist.
Zizioulas distinguishes between Person (Hypostasis, Ὑπόστασις) and Individual. The individual is defined byits nature (φύσις)—by its properties, categories, biological characteristics. The individual is for itself (in-dividuum—indivisible), a closed system.
The person, in contrast, is defined not by its nature but by relationship (relation, communion). Zizioulas'sdecisive formula ("Being as Communion"):
"Personhood as ekstasis and hypostasis of being. The person is, by definition, the being which is free fromthe necessity of its nature (physis)... The person is what it is by its relation to what is not itself."
Person is ekstasis (ἔκστασις)—going out from oneself toward the other. Person exists not for itself but inrelationship. Its identity is not substantialist ("what it is") but relational ("with whom it is in relationship").
This distinction may seem abstract, but its consequences are decisive for theodicy: the person is free fromnecessity. While the individual is subject to the laws of its nature—growth, aging, death—the person istranscendent to this necessity. The person exists in freedom because it exists in love—in relationship that isnot doomed by the laws of nature.
2.2. Death as the Tragedy of Substantialist Existence
From this follows Zizioulas's radical thesis about death ("Being as Communion"):
"[Death] is the tragic end of every being which is identified with its nature... The ultimate enemy of theperson is not sin, but death which is the consequence of the way nature operates in our fallen existence."
Death is not something external "added" to existence as punishment for sin. Death is the inherentconsequence of substantialist existence. When a being is defined by its nature (as individual), it is necessarilydoomed to dissolution, because every substance is temporal, composite, dependent on its elements whichultimately disintegrate.
Here is the true problem of theodicy: death is not something that "happens" to the living, but the mode inwhich substantialist being exists. As long as existence is substantialist, death is inevitable. And death—not sin—is the ultimate evil, because death means non-being, fragmentation, loss.
Zizioulas argues that the Fall consists precisely in this: humanity's identification with its own nature, withindividuality. Instead of existing personally (in relationship with God and one another), humanity chose toexist for itself—as individuals. And this choice made death inevitable.
2.3. God as Personal Being
But here Zizioulas poses the decisive question: if substantialist existence leads to death, how does God exist?Is God also substantialist? If God is also an individual, He too is doomed to death. But God is immortal andperfect. How is this possible?
The answer: God exists personally, not substantialistically. God is relationship—Trinity, where three persons(Father, Son, Spirit) exist in one another (περιχώρησις, perichoresis). God is not "one substance with threeproperties," but three persons in one communion.
Zizioulas's formula ("Being as Communion"):
"Being can exist as communion and freedom... The very being of God is communion. If this is so, then truebeing is achieved only through communion, which is realized in freedom and love."
God's being is communion. Not "God has communion," but God is communion. Personhood and relationshipare the mode of God's existence. This is precisely why God is free from death: He does not exist as asubstance that would be subject to necessity. God exists as freedom—personal freedom of existence inrelationship.
From this follows that God is not causa prima of substantialist being (which is doomed to death). God is thesource of personal being—a mode of existence that is free from death.
III. Eschatological Theodicy: "Remembering the Future"
3.1. Theodicy Not as Explanation but as Eschaton
Now we can formulate eschatological theodicy. Zizioulas's theodicy is not apologia (explanation of why evilexists) but prophecy (revelation of how God overcomes evil).
Traditional theodicy seeks an answer to the question: "Why?"—why did God create a world where evil exists?This is a retrospective question, directed toward the past, toward the moment of creation.
Zizioulas's theodicy answers a different question: "What?"—what is happening with death and evil? What isGod's response? This is a prospective (eschatological) question, directed toward the future, toward theeschaton.
Zizioulas's central thesis: God calls His creation "good" (καλόν) not in its fallen state, but in itseschatological fulfillment. When God declares in the Book of Genesis "and it was good," this is not adescription of the present state, but a prophecy of the eschaton—the world's completed, perfected, personallyconnected-to-God state.
This is what Zizioulas calls "Remembering the Future":
"The eschatological perception and the Kingdom of God serve as an inspiration, the truth that invites thosewho live by it to consider everything through the lens of the future Kingdom."
The goodness of creation is not static (which "was" in Eden and was lost) but dynamic—it is the future thatcomes from God and toward which God invites us. Creation is good because it will be perfect in the eschaton.
3.2. Christ: The First Person Who Defeated Death
How does this transformation from substantialist to personal existence occur? The answer: Incarnation andResurrection.
In Christ, human nature was redeemed from substantiality and assumed personally. Zizioulas:
"The restoration of personhood in Christ leads inevitably to the community of the Church... through thepersonhood of man."
Christ is the first true Person in human history—a human who exists not for himself (as individual) but fully inrelationship with God. Christ's self-identity is not defined by biological nature but by relationship with theFather: "I and the Father are one" (John 10:30).
This is precisely why Christ defeats death. Not because He has some magical power, but because He existspersonally. Death is necessary for substantialist being, but Christ does not exist substantialistically. He exists asrelationship—relationship with the Father, with humans, with the world. And this relationship isunconquerable by death.
The Resurrection is not an event about things (revival of a corpse) but the revelation of a new type ofexistence—personal existence that is not subject to biological necessity. The resurrected body is not fleshreturned-to-life, but personal body—a body that exists as communion, as relationship, and is therefore freefrom dissolution and death.
3.3. Eucharist as the Realization of the Eschaton
But how do we attain this personal existence? How does substantialist creation become personal? The answer:Eucharist.
For Zizioulas, the Eucharist is not merely a ritual or symbolic act. The Eucharist is the realization of theeschaton, the actualization of the Kingdom of God here and now:
"The Church is Eucharistic in its very nature... Eucharist is the event of the Kingdom where death is alreadyovercome."
In the Eucharist, the community of believers—different individuals—becomes a communion of persons.There is no longer "I" and "you" as separate individuals, but "we" as unity in Christ. In this moment, humansexist not as separate substances but as persons in relationship.
And because this existence is personal, it transcends death. In the Eucharist we already live in the resurrectedBody (Body of Christ), which is personal, not substantialist. The Eucharist is "remembering the future"—thatfuture which is already here but not yet fulfilled.
From this follows Zizioulas's radical conclusion:
"The ascetic life culminates in the Eucharist."
Asceticism—self-restraint, renunciation of one's individual needs—is practical theodicy. When a personrenounces their ego, their individuality, their substantialist existence, they are freed from the necessity thatleads to death. Asceticism is the practical path from individual to person.
And this process culminates in the Eucharist, where ascetic life is realized in communion—in relationship thatis resurrected life, life that is already beyond death.
IV. Theodicy as Eschatological Event: God's Justification in the Resurrection
4.1. The Eschaton as God's "Response" to Evil
Now we can formulate eschatological theodicy with full clarity:
God's justification is not a logical explanation but an eschatological event—the defeat of death in theResurrection and the restoration of personal existence in communion.
Traditional theodicy attempts to explain why God has the right to create a world where evil exists. It seekslogical justification. But this approach is impossible because:
If being is substantialist, death is necessary
If God created a substantialist world, God created death
If God created death, God is not justified
2. 3.
Western theology attempts to avoid this logic with various arguments (free will, greater good, etc.), but all theseattempts are futile because they do not change the ontological framework.
Zizioulas's revolution consists in changing the question itself:
Not: "Why did God create a world where death exists?"
But: "What is God's response to death?"
The first question is retrospective and leads to accusation ("why did you do this?"). The second question isprospective and leads to acknowledgment ("what are you doing?").
And God's response is: Resurrection. God does not explain death—God defeats death. God does not give alogical scheme explaining why evil must exist—God enters death (the Cross) and destroys it from within(Resurrection).1.
4.2. Personal Communion as the Realization of Theodicy
The final formula of eschatological theodicy:
God is justified not by the "excellence" of His creation, but by the perfection of His action—therestoration of personal existence in the eschaton.
In Zizioulas's vision, theodicy is not justification of what is but promise of what will be. God is justified bythe fact that:
God did not create death—death is the consequence of substantialist existence, and God created notsubstantialist beings but invited into personal existence
God Himself entered death—in Christ, God Himself went through the path of death
God defeated death—through the Resurrection, God revealed personal existence that is free fromnecessity
God invites us into the eschaton—in the Eucharist and ultimately in the Kingdom of God, where allcreation will be personal and death will no longer exist
2. 3. 4.
This is dynamic theodicy, not static. God is justified not by what He said ("let there be...") but by what Hedoes (restores, resurrects, brings into communion).
4.3. Theodicy as Personal Freedom
And here we arrive at the deepest conclusion: true theodicy is personal existence itself.
When a human exists as person—that is, in relationship, in love, freely, ecstatically (gone out from oneself)—they transcend the being in which death is necessary. And in this transcendence, God is acknowledged asgood:
"Love is not one of the properties of being, but a way of being... Love, if it is to be true love, must be theevent of the loss of one's identity in the other."
When a person loses their identity in the other (in love), they are no longer an individual doomed to death.They are a person who exists immortally in relationship.
In Zizioulas's words ("Communion and Otherness"):
"Love is not one of the properties of being, but a way of being... Love, if it is to be true love, must be theevent of the loss of one's identity in the other."
Thus, theodicy becomes not theory but praxis. God is justified not by words but by life—the life lived bypersons in communion. Every time a human loves another (impossibly, self-sacrificially, ecstatically), God isjustified, because this love is resurrected life—life that transcends death.
V. Conclusion: Why Only Eschatological Ontology Justifies God
Now we can formulate the final answer:
Theodicy is impossible within the framework of substantialist ontology because substantialist existencenecessarily includes death. Western theology, from Leibniz to Caputo, fails to justify God because it operatesin an ontological framework where being is defined by nature and therefore subject to necessity.1.
Caputo's "weak God" approaches an alternative by rejecting the sovereign, omnipotent God. As Derrida (whomCaputo cites) writes in "Rogues":
"For wherever the name of God allows us to think something else, for example, a vulnerable nonsovereignty,suffering and divisible, even mortal, capable of contradicting itself or of repenting (a thought that isimpossible and without example), that would be a completely different story, perhaps even a story of Godwho deconstructs himself in his ipseity."
But Caputo remains in apophatic space—he says what God is not, but does not offer a positive ontology.Caputo also lacks an eschatological perspective—for him, the "weak God" is a constant call but not afulfillment.
Zizioulas's eschatological ontology offers a radical solution:
Ontological revolution: personal existence replaces substantialist. Existence is defined not by nature(φύσις) but by relationship (communion)
New understanding of death: death is not "punishment" or "event" but the internal law of substantialistexistence. Death is inevitable when existence is individual
Redirection of theodicy: the question changes from "why?" to "what?". God responds not with explanationbut with action—Resurrection
Eschaton as justification: God is justified not in the past (at the moment of creation) but in the future (theeschaton), where the world will be completed as personal communion
Eucharist as realization: theodicy is not only "in the future"—it is already realized now in the Eucharist,where death is defeated and humans exist personally
Practical theodicy: God is justified not by theory but by life—life in communion, where love (personalexistence) defeats death
2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Final Formula
God is justified not by explaining evil but by defeating it. And God defeats evil not by force but by love—bypersonal existence that is transcendent to death.
In substantialist ontology, theodicy is impossible because death is necessary. In personal ontology, theodicy isnecessary because the person is free—free from necessity, free from death.
And this freedom is not merely an "idea" or "symbol"—it is reality that is realized here and now in theEucharist, and will be fulfilled in the eschaton. Theodicy is not argument but Resurrection.
Therefore, only eschatological ontology—Zizioulas's personal and relational ontology—can truly justify God.Not with words but with life. Not in the past but in the future. Not with explanation but with transformation.Not with logic but with love.
And this love, this personal existence in communion, is God's glory (δόξα)—the revelation that justifies Godnot with words but with being: being that is free, that is love, that is resurrected, that is immortal.1.